Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Colombia by Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Colombia





Chapter Title: Chapter 4 Tariffs, Prior Deposits, and the Import Exchange Rate
Chapter Author: Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4042
Chapter pages in book: (p. 100 - 123)Chapter 4
be
r
Tariffs, Prior Deposits, and






In this chapter and the next two, I will go into some detail on the mechanics of
the different import-restraining policy instruments. Emphasis will be placed ed.
on how they operated in about 1971, with retrospective glances whenever data
warrant them. These chapters will be largely descriptive, leaving a good share d
of the discussion on the effects of these policy instruments on resource
allocation, growth, income distribution, employment, and national autonomy j
forChapter 8. Both economically and bureaucratically, the several import- 9'
repressingmechanisms overlap and interact; so it will not be either possible or
desirable to discuss each mechanism in isolation from all the others, i.e., to
omit all references to, say, import controls when discussing tariffs.
THE TARIFF
The universal debate between protectionists and free traders took Colombian
root quite early in the nineteenth century and, as elsewhere, has never been
resolved.' Historically, transport costs from the Colombian coasts to its
central highlands, where a large share of the population lives, have been high,
providing a significant but declining natural protection for some areas of the
country. On the other hand, because of these high transport costs, enterprises
located in regions near the Atlantic coast or the banks of the Magdalena river
found it more convenient to import manufactures from Europe or North
America than to buy them from the struggling craftsmen and infant industries e
of the highlands.2 r
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It has been argued conventionally that the primary function of the Colom-
bian tariff during the 1920s was to provide the central government with
revenue.3 A completely new tariff schedule was adopted in 1931, using the
balance of payments as a partial justification. For a sample of nontraditional
industries, David Chu has found that although Colombian nominal tariffs rose
between 1927 and 1936, the median level of effective protection fell slightly,
from 19 to 17 per cent in ad valorem equivalents. The ranking of industries
according to the level of effective protection also changed little between those
two dates, but perhaps enough to stimulate some leading industrial sectors.
The average of nominal tariff rates for all imports was 23 per cent in 1927, 25
per cent in 1936, and 15 per cent in 1945. As prices rose during the Second
World War, the 1931 tariff modifications, based on specific taxes, became less
effective, and multiple exchange rates were introduced in part as an alterna-
• tive to tariffs.
Major revisions of the tariff schedule took place again in 1951 and in 1959;
both of them were protectionist in intent.4 Average nominal duties, in ad
valorem equivalents, for items not on the prohibited list were 17 per cent in the
1951 tariff and 48 per cent in the 1959 tariff. The tariff increase was greater for
of manufactured consumer goods, rising from 18 to 53 per cent in ad valorem
ed equivalents, than for intermediate inputs into industry, which rose from 22 to
ita 40 per cent. The tariff at both dates included specific as well as ad valorem
tre duties; as late as 1962, 30 per cent of the value of assessed tariffs came from
ce specific duties.5
fly In December 1964 a new tariff schedule was decreed, adopting the
Brussels nomenclature (BNM) and containing only ad valorem duties. How-
or ever, since that date, and acting under special powers, the government
to introduced a bewildering number of changes in the tariff, particularly during
the import liberalization episode of 1965—66 and again in 1968—71. The duty
rates on many items have been changed several times between 1964 and 1971,
under special laws by which Congress granted the Executive, or the latter
assumed, the power to carry out such changes without detailed congressional
approval, but for limited periods of time. Merely between January 1965 and
an December 1966, it is estimated that nearly one thousand tariffs were changed
en (mostly increases); there were also temporary surcharges, for three or four
its years, on many consumer goods and even on intermediate and capital goods
•'h, aimed at smoothing the liberalization process. The power of the Executive to
-'he carry out such changes without congressional approval expired in 1971, but
;es the government quickly requested from Congress a new general law allowing
'er frequent (although limited) rate changes. The process of selecting which duties
rth were to be changed, and by how much, has remained somewhat of a mystery
•jes even to close observers of the committee on tariff policy, which has been
responsible for tariff modifications.102TARIFFS, PRIOR DEPOSITS, AND THE IMPORT EXCHANGE RATE
TABLE 4-1
Import Duties Collected as Percentages of Peso Value of Merchandise Imports and of
Central Government Tax Revenues, 1943—72
Ratios of Ratios of
Duties to Duties to
Ratios of Central Govt. Ratios of Central Govt.
Duties to Tax Duties to Tax
Year Imports Revenues Year Imports Revenues
1943 14.8% 26.1% 1958 7.6% 13.5%
1944 14.9 24.4 1959 13.6 22.4
1945 14.7 29.2 1960 16.6 29.2
1946 12.2 27.2 1961 15.1 28.2
1947 10.3 26.1 1962 14.1 26.9
1948 10.0 20.8 1963 12.6 19.2
1949 8.3 13.5 1964 12.7 16.7
1950 12.7 21.2 1965 15.0 15.9
1951 21.8 36.8 1966 22.5 31.9
1952 18.9 32.1 1967 15.! 15.2
1953 18.3 35.7 1968 13.1 15.9
1954 20.0 36.9 1969 14.1 15.5
1955 16.1 25.8 1970 17.3 19.0
1956 13.4 20.6 1971 15.4 16.5
1957 9.4 17.7 1972 14.6 15.9
SOURCE: Basic data from DANE-AGDE, various issues, and BdIR-RdBdIR, various
issues.
During 1973 and early 1974 a large number of duties were reduced, partly
to offset increases in the world price level and partly to fight smuggling. About
2,500 tariff items were changed. Colombia has also been following the tariff
reduction timetable of the Andean Common Market, applicable to trade
among the members and calling for annual cuts in segments of ten percentage
points from a base no higher than 100 per cent, starting on December 31, 1971.
A first attempt at quantification of the impact of the tariff is presented in
Table 4-1, showing the de facto "average tariff" (first column) and the share of
central government tax revenues accounted for by duties collected over the
years from 1943 through 1972. The most striking feature of the data in this
table is the repeated pattern of gradual declines followed by abrupt increases
in both percentages without any obvious over-all trend for the whole period.
The abrupt increases (in 1951, 1959—60, and 1965—66) coincide with tariff
reforms. The unusually high tariff revenues in 1966 are also partly accounted
for by increased imports of automobiles, which even at rates lower than those
of earlier years yielded substantial sums.THE TARIFF 103
The course of the average tariff (duties collected as a percentage of
import values) from 1951 through 1972 can be quite well explained statistically
as a function not only of years.elapsed since the last major tariff reform but
also of the level and composition of imports. The best results of attempts at
explanation are presented in Table 4-2. It can be argued that after adjustment
is made for years elapsed since the last major tariff reform as indicated by the
always significant dummy, remaining increases in the average tariff reflect
import liberalization. Thus, there is a significant and positive link between the
average tariff and the level of imports whether measured in absolute or in
relative terms. Significant links also exist with the share of consumer goods in
the import bill (positive, because these goods are taxed at above-average
rates) and with that of capital goods (negative, because these goods are taxed
below the average). No such links were found with the share for raw materials
and intermediate products. These conclusions are also supported by a regres-
sion (not shown) of the average tariffs as a function of the shares of consumer,
intermediate, and capital goods in the import bill, without a constant term.
The respective average tariffs estimated for each of those groups according to
this regression are 72, 10, and 7 per cent; but only the coefficient for the share
of consumer goods has a t statistic larger than 2.0.
It may be thought that the gradual erosion in tariff revenues following
reforms may be due to the presence of specific duties within a worldwide
inflationary setting. The pattern, however, has been present even following
the 1965 conversion of all duties into ad valorem rates. A more plausible and
general explanation for the power of the dummy in Table 4-2 is the tendency
for tariff reform to involve, for fiscal reasons, an increase in the rates charged
to intermediate and capital goods, plus those on a few luxury consumer
durables, as well as a tightening of loopholes and abolition of ad hoc exemp-
tions. On balance, these measures, which are favored by the Treasury, lower
the effective protective rates for most existing industries, since in most cases
direct competitors are kept out by prohibitions and the licensing mechanism.
As a result, shortly after its inception the reform faces a relentless gnawing by
special interests, who seek lower input rates and exemptions, until that
process goes so far as to arouse fresh demands for tariff reforms.
Table 4-3 shows estimates based on a sample of products for the extent of
exemptions from import duties shortly after the tariff reform of December
• 1964. In the key categories "other intermediate goods" and "other capital
goods," making up nearly 60 per cent of all sampled imports, the gradual
expansion of exemptions can be seen. Besides the Vallejo Plan, discussed in
Chapter 2, other total or partial exemptions include those relating to imports
from Andean and other LAFTA sources, those for "basic industries" (e.g.,
sulphur, pig iron, coal, chemical pulp, fishing, etc.), imports for the public
sector, imports financed with AID credits, plus other ad hoc exemptions.104TARIFFS,PRIOR DEPOSITS, AND THE IMPORT EXCHANGE RATE
TABLE 4-2
(t statistics inparentheses)




























































Regressions for Import Duties Collected as Percentages of Peso Value of Merchandise
Imports, 1951—72
R2 =coefficientof multiple determination.
DWDurbin-Watson statistic.
























Relative import level refers to total imports of a given year divided by the average imports
during the previous three years, with the result multiplied by 100.THE TARIFF 105
















Automobiles 228 51 85 71 71 71 2.2
Other consumer goods 28 28 24 81 84 70 3.4
Foodstuffs 20 10 17 99 9 22 4.2
Other raw materials 14 15 17 100 100 100 4.1
intermediate goods for
agriculture 3 13 6 99 100 100 2.0
Other intermediate goods 17 25 24 93 93 88 34.0
Transportation
equipment 23 42 27 90 85 74 6.0
Capital goods for
agriculture 3 8 5 80 82 78 3.1
Other capital goods 17 13 16 61 57 48 24.8
Unclassified 20 49 12 62 87 63 16.2
Total sample 19 28 22 79 79 70 100.0
SOURCE: Unpublishedestimates of DANE and Contraloria (Colombian Office of the Comptrol-
ler), based on a sample of different types of imports. Average duties for all imports in this table,
therefore, need not coincide with those in Table 4-1.
These are not always automatic; many require applications that are subject to
review and approval. By 1967, 30 per cent of all imports were exempted from
duties; more than half of nonagricultural capital goods imports were tariff-free.
A rough estimate places exempted imports at 33 per cent of the total in 1969.
Other tariff loopholes arise from the practice of levying different rates for
the same product, depending on its final use. For example, a much lower duty
will be levied on an automobile which allegedly is to be used as a taxi ("public
service") than an identical car imported for private use. That is why one finds
cars painted as taxis which do not seem to stop for any customer. That
practice also lends itself to the setting up of special tariff subcategories
benefiting powerful interests; the knowledgeable can tell why input X bears a
tariff of only 10 per cent if used in producing product Y, while bearing one of
50 per cent "for other industries." Clearly, the tariff is not a purely indepen-
dent variable in the Colombian socioeconomic system.
It will be seen in Chapter 5thatthe import control authority can grant
"global licenses" covering several items making up a factory or a productive
TABLE 4-3
I.
4106TARIFFS,PRIOR DEPOSITS, AND THE IMPORT EXCHANGE RATE
unit. When such a license is obtained, the importer will pay a single tariff rate
on the value of the whole group of commodities. The duty will be the one for
the "key machine" in the productive unit. As the importer has the option of
seeking a global license or a sequence of ordinary ones, often the global
license is requested when the "key machine" carries a low duty and the
peripheral items higher ones. The committee supervising tariff policy can also
grant a low ad hoc tariff rate to some global licenses.
To obtain a more detailed and yet manageable view of the Colombian
tariff structure as it stood in about 1971—73, the rates for a sample of 125
important products, first chosen for 1962 by Santiago Macario,6 have been
analyzed. This will allow us, inter alia, to examine net changes occurring
between 1962 and 1973. The regime to which each of the products was
subjected in the import control mechanism, i.e., whether it was placed on the
free, prior license, or prohibited list, was noted. These three lists will be
examined in the next chapter; the free list covers commodities for which no
prior license was needed, while the prohibited list includes those for which the p
import ban was absolute, unless they were imported under the Vallejo Plan or
for other very restricted purposes. The import duties listed for the prohibited
category are thus not totally unimportant, as the deposit which Vallejo Plan
users must make with the government as guarantee that those imports will be
used exclusively for exporting is related to the size of the duties for the
"prohibited" items. Finally, the 1971 prior import deposit for each product
was also recorded. This information is summarized in Table 4-4; note that
since it is based on rates and information read off the tariff books, it refers to
nonexempt items.
Consider first the tariff as it stood in 1971. On the whole, the rates look
quite "reasonable," particularly for items not on the prohibited list. There are
few extravagantly high duties. As shown in Chapter 2, however, the tariff
schedule by itself is capable of generating very high ERPs which fluctuate a
good deal among activities.It may be seen in Table 4-4 that duties on
industrial raw materials, capital goods, and semimanufactured products were
substantially lower than those for processed foodstuffs and all kinds of
consumer goods. The average duties for industrial raw materials and capital
goods on the prior license list are 16—26 per cent, a level which at best is
unlikely to exceed by very much the degree of overvaluation of the peso.
The simple mean of the duties in 1971 for the 367 items that make up
Chapter 84 of the Colombian tariff (nonelectrical machinery) is 27 per cent,
which is similar to that for capital goods in the sample. The corresponding
figure for the 161 items of Chapter 85 (electrical machinery) is somewhat
higher, 38 per cent, but this chapter includes many consumer goods.




Colombian Duties and Other Restrictions on Selected
Nonexempt Imports from Non-LAFTA Sources,
1962,1971, and 1973
(standarddeviations in parentheses)
53 53 185 67 96
(29) (29)(217) (44) (54)
69 64 272 100 130
34 35 23 29 40
— — 145 — —
18 19 35 53 72
(12) (16) (32) (50) (59)
44 44 72 100 130
15 16 20 48 66
— 19 — —
31 26 19 27 32
(21) (16) (15) (30) (36)
— — 30 — —
33 26 26 30 35
23 25 12 8 7
(mci. processed fuels),
other than products of27 27 27 50 67
traditional industries (17) (16) (37) (41) (51)
Prohibited 29 29 200 100 130
Prior license 26 27 23 45 63
Freelist 28 27 19 58 58
90 91 341 95 116
(53) (51)(326) (19) (28)
102 100 426 100 120
69 74 90 86 110
— — 250 — —
Durable consumer goods 74 80 108 90 97
(40) (26) (31) (30) (39)
Prohibited — 84 114 — 100
Prior license 74 79 93 90 96

























Ad Valorem Prior ImportNumber of Items in
Duties Deposits Group Subject
(Per Cent)
Import 1973 1971 1962
(Per Cent) to Each Regime
1973 1971 1962 1973 1971


























Ad Valorem Prior ImportNumber of Items in




(Per Cent) to Each Regime
1973 1971 1973 1971 1962
Other consumer goods
(md. semimfd.
prdducts of traditional87 87 163 80 99 17 17 17
industries) (66) (66)(145) (36) (47)
Prohibited 142 142 247 100 130 6 6 10
Prior license 62 62 44 75 90 10 10 4





































SOURCE: Datafor 1962, as well as the classification scheme and product list, were obtained from
Santiago Macario, "Protectionism and industrialization in Latin America,' Economic Bulletin for
Latin America, March 1964, pp. 61—101. Data for 1971 (September)were obtained from Repdblica de
Colombia,Arancel de Aduanas (Bogota: Alfonso Valderrama A., 1971). Data for 1973 (March) were
obtained from ibid. (Bogota: Gustavo Ibarra Merlano, 1973).
All figures shown are simple arithmetic averages. When an item (say, forklifts) had been subdivided
into more than two classes, each with its own duty or prior deposit, sometimes determined not by the
nature of the product but by its final use, a simple average of all the classes was taken. (In several cases
there were large differences among the duties averaged.) When a given item had been subdivided into
just two classes, only the duty applied to the class judged most common was recorded. In cases of
subdivision, the predominant import regime was recorded. In all cases of doubt, the more liberal regime
was used.
Import duties include the standard ad valorem rates plus consular fees and across-the-board
surcharges. During 1971, the fees and surcharges amounted to 4 per cent ad valorem: consular fees were
I per cent ad valorem, and the surcharges for financing PROEXPO and the Coffee Fund were per
cent each.
Promotion laws exempt many imports from all duties, but this is not taken account of in the table.
which frequently makes it more protectionist than it appears at first sight, and
always more distortive—involving the treatment of used goods, particularly
used durable consumer goods. Many second-hand goods are valued when
imported as if they were new, on the feeble grounds that otherwise valuation
would be difficult to ascertain exactly, thus allegedly opening the door to all
sorts of "irregularities." The tariff legislation explicitly states, for example,
that used automobiles are to be valued at the prices they had when they came
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TABLE 4-4 (concluded)
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fresh from the factory. When these regulations are applied to capital goods not
produced in Colombia, they tend to reduce the effective protection given to
their users, while discouraging a more efficient use of the nation's available
foreign exchange (and probably of its labor force also).
There appear to be at least two conflicting considerations in establishing
interactions between tariffs and import controls. On the one hand "essen-
tials" tend to be treated more leniently by both instruments, while "luxuries"
are penalized by both, as evidenced by the mostly redundant high duties on
items on the prohibited list. On the other hand, some attempts have been
made, particularly during 1965—66, to raise tariffs on items on the free list,
consciously coordinating the use of both tariffs and import controls. While
that coordination is assured on paper, the facts are that tariffs and import
control regimes are each set by a different bureaucratic organization. As a
result, except during periods of major policy changes, when high-ranking
authorities are very conscious of this issue, each policy variable is handled
without much regard to how the other is being manipulated.
• As a member of the Aridean Common Market, Colombia has agreed to
bring its tariff schedule in line with the Andean Minimum Common External
Tariff (AMCET) by 1975 and to adopt the Andean Common External Tariff
(ACET) by 1980. The AMCET, agreed upon by the member countries in
— December1970, is in fact fairly close to the Colombian tariff schedule, but
m witha lower average tariff and less spread.7 It is far from clear, however, what
the final ACET will look like.
The net changes in the tariff between 1962 and 197 1—73, according to
Table 4-4, may be summarized as follows: a lowering of average rates, mainly
by the reduction of very high rates for items on the prohibited list, and a
he narrowing of the spread of duties, not only by the elimination of extravagantly
high ones but also by the increase of very low ones. This may be seen more
of clearly in Table 4-5: by 1971—73, duties had on average fallen on those items
which in 1962 had duties of 40 per cent or more; at the same time, duties were
rd on the whole higher on those items which in 1962 had duties of less than 40 per
re cent. These changes are more dramatic among goods which in 1962 had duties
er above 99 per cent and below 20 per cent. By 1973, of the 124 sampled items, 71
per cent had duties within the range from 20 per cent to 70 per cent; in 1962,
that percentage was only 42 per cent. This information is complemented by
the data in Table 4-6, which shows that the most arithmetically significant
tariff cuts occurred among items that were on the prohibited list both in 1962
and 1971, and that there were less extensive cuts in the items transferred from
the 1962 prohibited list to the 1971 prior license list. Duties were raised on the
few items which were on the free list both in 1962 and 1971.
The trend between 1962 and 1971—73, then, has been toward a rationali-
zation of the tariff and a diminution of its distorting effects. The changes of the110TARIFFS, PRIOR DEPOSITS, AND THE IMPORT EXCHANGE RATE
TABLE 4-5
Average Ad Valorem 0uties of Selected Imported Products
Grouped by Their 1962 Duties
in 1962, 1971, and 1973,
Average Duties for Group of Number of Products in
Level of 1962 Duties
Same Products Each Group
1962 1971 1973 1962 1971 1973
100% and higher 276% 87% 87% 38 16 14
70% to 99% 81 54 49 9 7 8
40% to 69% 48 38 38 13 30 32
20% to 39% 27 26 30 30 41 48
Zero to 19% 6 15 15 34 30 22—
SOURCES AND METHOD: Sameas Table 4-4.
last decade, furthermore, leave Colombia with a tariff schedule which would
require relatively few changes if import controls were abolished, particularly if
ad hoc tariff exemptions were also eliminated.8
It should be added that the Colombian sales tax also contained protec-
tionist elements, as its rates bore more heavily on imports than on domestic
production for a (small) number of commodities, such as alcoholic beverages, d
canned goods, and clothing. The Musgrave Report recommended abolishing
the use of the sales tax as a supplementary instrument of protection as well as a
instituting a better coordination of tariffs with luxury taxation, but as with d
most of the other recommendations in the report Congress had failed to act as ti
of Indeed, during December 1970 Congress levied a heavy sales- c
consumption tax on foreign cigarettes, which led to a drying up of registered
imports of these goods and a dramatic increase in contraband traffic in them,
which became a subject of scandalized public discussion during August and
September 1971.10
Another institutional fact of some interest concerns the frequent com-
plaints of law-abiding importers regarding the actual management of some
customs offices, which allegedly impose not only normal tariff burdens on
some, but also costly delays and petty nuisances, while freeing luckier or less
scrupulous importers from their taxes. Even with the best will confusion can
arise over product specification, but it is not unusual for an importer to face a
hostile stance from customs officials. Furthermore, warehouses and other
facilities in major ports are said to be in poor shape, inducing losses." These
circumstances, of course, are also widespread in other countries, and are
hardly unique Colombian features.
A detailed FEDESARROLLO study'2 of tariffsas they stood on Decem-
ber 1972 and June 1974 on the whole confirms the results described above.





Changes in Regime and Average Duty Between 1962 and 1971 for Selected Imported
Products







Free list Free list 5 6% 19%
Free list Prior license 35 33 33
Free list Prohibited 1 88 24
Prior license Free list 4 42 30
Prior license Prior license 42 38 37
Prior license Prohibited 0
Prohibited Free list 0 — —
Pro hibited Prior license 11 116 65
Prohibited Prohibited 26 328 93
All products 124 104 49
SOURCES AND METHOD: Sameas Table 4-4.
deposits, are lower than those shown in Table 4-4 (35percent for 1972 and 29
per cent for 1974). Butthesame pattern is observed in duties classified
according to import regimes; for 1972, for example, the averages of nominal
duties for items on the prohibited, prior license, and free lists were, respec-
tively, 60 per cent, 39 per cent, and 12 per cent. Weighting methods did not
change results significantly.
The average effective rate of protection generated just by these nominal
rates (including the opportunity costs of prior deposits) were calculated, using
the Corden method, at 34 per cent in 1972 and 35percent in 1974. But a large
dispersion of effective rates of protection was also found, a dispersion that
apparently increased between 1972 and 1974. Sectoral rankings according to
effective and nominal rates of protection are not significantly different at the 5
percent confidence level; rankings with and without the tariff implicit in prior
deposits are also similar. No significant links could be found between rankings
according to protection and economic characteristics of various sectors, such
as labor intensity.
Prior import deposits were initiated in 1951 and set at a modest 10 per cent of
the desired import value. Thus, during most of the period under study, before
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stipulated amount, expressed as a percentage of the import value, with the
Banco de la Repüblica, and the money had to remain on deposit, earning no
interest and eroded by inflation, until after the specific merchandise had
cleared Colombian customs. During 1971—72 the advance deposit was calcu-
lated on the f.o.b. value of imports, at the average exchange rate for the
previous month. The time elapsing between deposit of the money and its
return has varied from period to period. During 1958 the lag began to be
deliberately stretched, with a decree stating that deposits would not be
returned to the importer until Sixty days after the goods had reached a
Colombian port. By 1963, import deposits were immobilized for an average of
ten months. The lag was about six or eight months during 1964, with free-list
imports typically involving shorter deposit periods than those approved under
the prior license regime. By 1966 the corresponding figure was estimated at
nine months. Around 1971, the lag averaged roughly seven or eight months.
Beginning in 1964, additional advance deposits have also been required
for obtaining the foreign exchange needed to pay for the imports once they
cleared customs. The advance payments deposits in about 1971 were equiva-
lent to 95 per cent of the import value and had to be placed with the Banco de
Ia Repüblica at least twenty days prior to the issuance of the exchange license
needed to obtain the foreign currency.
Prior deposits were originally introduced as one more mechanism to
repress imports, but their increased use during the balance-of-payments trou-
bles of the second half of the 1950s, particularly since mid-1957, turned them
into a critical tool of monetary policy. By 1960, as may be seen in Table 4-7,
the stock of import deposits reached 24 per cent of the import flow for that
year, and 16 per cent of the stock of total domestic credit (or 22 per cent of the
money supply). At least since that time, prior deposits became a widely
disliked institution, by both businessmen and policymakers. Only the weak-
ness of more orthodox monetary tools, such as reserve requirements and
rediscounting, arising from the power of commercial banks and some other
private groups, such as the Coffee Federation, vis-à-vis the central bank,
induced the survival of prior deposits. Nevertheless, the importance of prior
deposits has, on the whole, been declining since 1960, although that trend has
not been smooth. During prosperous 1973, prior import deposit rates were
sharply reduced and almost eliminated. Advance deposits for buying foreign
exchange, however, were increased.
As tools of monetary policy, prior import deposits and advanced deposits
for buying foreign exchange are clumsy and inflexible and can lead to serious
conflict between the goals of import liberalization and monetary stability. For
example, the reductions in prior deposit rates adopted beginning in October
1965, as part of the import liberalization program, resulted, with a lag, in an
unwanted increase in the money supply, particularly alter June 1966, in spite
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authorities from totally eliminating prior deposits; as late as 1968 a plan to
eliminate these deposits within a year was abandoned for that reason. On the r
restrainingside this tool has on occasion been the only available instrument
capable of rapidly stemming excessive monetary expansion, as during 1962.
The practical elimination of prior import deposits during 1973, as part of the
continuing liberalization process, was undertaken in the midst of an inflation-
ary boom, and the authorities, quickly becoming fearful of the monetary
consequences of that move, raised the advance deposits for buying foreign
exchange as an offsetting measure.
Both prior import deposits and prior deposits required for buying foreign
exchange have been relatively less effective in repressing imports than as
monetary tools. The exact opportunity cost of the immobilized balances,
including the advance payments deposits expressed as ad valorem' tariff
equivalents, is difficult to establish exactly, and given capital market imperfec-
tions it is likely to differ considerably among firms. Some companies may
obtain foreign suppliers' credits for that purpose (it has even been argued that
the 1959—60 increases in prior deposits led to an inflow of "hot money" into
Colombia), others can obtain credit from their banks, but still others, particu-
larly smaller ones, may suffer severe hardships in raising the needed cash.
Colombian businessmen, who complain constantly about shortages of work-
ing capital, find the prior deposits particularly obnoxious. Alberto R. Musalem
has estimated the ad-valorem-equivalent incidence of prior import and
advance payments deposits at 11 per cent, on average, for For
more recent years the corresponding figure is lower, below 5 per cent. An
across-the-board tariff increase of a few percentage points or a slightly faster
rate of exchange depreciation seems like a small price to pay for the elimination
of prior deposits, whose regressive incidence accentuates the concentration of
economic power in Colombia.
Prior import deposits during January—May 1971 ranged from 1 to 130 per
cent ad valorem. As shown in Table 4-4, on average, items on the prohibited
list bore the highest rates (as with tariffs) and those on the free list had the
lowest rates. As noted when discussing the tariff, the tendency to penalize
"luxuries" and encourage "necessities" frequently prevailed over the policy
of choosing between alternative, nonduplicating instruments to restrain
imports. The spread in prior deposits was somewhat narrower than for tariffs,
and the ranking by incidence on different commodity categories was also
slightly different. Capital goods, for example, whose tariff rates are roughly in
line with those for industrial raw materials and semimanufactured products,
bore lower prior deposits on average.
As with tariffs, there are many exemptions from prior import deposits,
including aid-financed imports, those made by the government and public
entities, some capital goods, imports from LA ViTA, and most nonreimbursableTHE AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS 115
imports.Prior import deposits are regulated by the top monetary authority,
• the Junta Monetaria, presumably in coordination with the Consejo de PolItica
Aduanera, which isin charge of the tariff, and with INCOMEX, which
manages import controls. In fact, many inconsistencies exist in the use of
these instruments; for example, in some cases, the prior deposit for inputs is
- higherthan for the finished products using those inputs, while the tariff
/ situation is more normal. Those cases are reviewed on an ad hoc basis, as
1 producers complain of the situation to the Junta Monetaria.
In
s THE AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE APPLICABLE
TO MERCHANDISE IMPORTS
By 1971 the exchange rate applied to imports had in real terms reached its
y highest sustained postwar levels, as can be seen in Table 4-8. The basic single
nominal rate had also been unified with the rates applicable to minor exports
o (excluding CAT) and to capital transactions; minor statistical discrepancies
1- show up nowadays only because of timing differences in the recorded transac-
- tions.As indicated in the second column of Table 4-8, the real rate has also
been quite stable around a gently rising trend since the reforms of March 1967.
-n Matters were not always this tranquil and orderly. There were times, as
during the 1965—66 liberalization episode, when two major rates were applied
to imports: a preferential rate of 9 pesos per U.S. dollar, the old rate, and a
new intermediate rate of 13.50 pesos, to which all imports were gradually
transferred, while most private capital transactions took place in an uncon-
in • trolledfree market. An earlier switch, from the precarious exchange stability
of the mid-1950s to more realistic levels after mid-1957, can also be observed
in Table 4-8.
er The crucial hesitations in exchange policy which occurred during 1958—59
can also be seen in this table. During late 1957 and 1958 a relatively high
import rate was achieved by means of a fluctuating basic "certificate" rate,
combined with, for most imports, a 10 per cent remittance tax, which can be
incorporated into the exchange rate. From April 1958 until early 1959, that tax
in had to be paid with U.S. dollars purchased in the fluctuating free market. In
:s, January 1959, importers were given the option of making payments through
so the free market, in which case they were exempted from the 10 per cent
•in remittance tax. In May 1959 that tax was absorbed, in principle, into customs
Is, duties, with the first ten percentage points of the duty insofar as applicable,
being payable in U.S. dollars. The wise de facto flexibility which had existed
•ts, for the average effective import rate during 1958 and early 1959 was dead.
lic After May 1959, the basic selling certificate rate of 6.4 pesos, which had been
)le reached by October 1958 after attaining a high of 6.8 in June 1958, became ther
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TABLE 4-8
Nominal Exchange Rate (NER)on Merchandise Imports, 1948—72
Average NER
(pesos per PPP-NER instability























































































































































1964I 9.00 8.04 5.25
II 9.00 7.56 4.02
III 9.00 7.56 3.54
IV 9.00 7.56 2.59
19651 9.00 7.58 1.56
11 9.00 7.34 0.86
III 9.37 7.54 1.54
IV 12.21 9.25 7.21
19661 12.42 9.12 7.50
II 12.68 8.88 7.36
III 13.13 9.22 7.64
IV 13.53 9.31 2.21
19671 13.32 9.03 2.61
II 13.68 9.12 2.21
III 14.34 9.45 2.15
IV 15.05 9.80 2.83
[9681 15.64 10.17 3.03
II 15.96 10.14 2.85
III 16.26 10.35 2.46
IV 16.50 10.53 1.97
19691 16.78 10.68 1.38
[1 17.02 10.64 1.40
111 17.30 10.75 1.14
[V 17.65 10.78 0.78
19701 17.79 10.92 0.75
II 18.08 10.82 0.88
III 18.37 11.02 1.09
IV 19.10 11.28 1.61
19711 19.44 11.32 1,37
II 19.82 11.28 1.23
III 20.30 11.37 0.97
IV 20.80 11.38 0.40
1972I 21.32 11.60 0.79
II 21.82 11.57 0.77
III 22.23 11.55 0.61
IV 22.71 11.47 0.76
SOURCE: Average nominal exchange rate is obtained by dividing import
peso value, c.i.f., by import dollar values. The purchasing-power-parity-
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Notesto Table 4-8 (concluded)
adjusted rate (PPP-NER) is obtained by dividing the nominal rate by the
ratio of Colombian to U.S. wholesale prices. The index of instability of the
purchasing-power-parity-adjusted rate is computed as in Chapter 2, i.e., it is
the average of the absolute value of quarter-to-quarter percentage changes
for four consecutive quarters. When the index is given for a year, it covers
the four quarterly changes during that year; when it is given for a quarter, it
refers to the percentage changes during that quarter and the preceding
three quarters. Basic data were obtained from IMF-IFS; figures for 1958,
1959, and 1960 have been revised frequently in that publication. Those
shown here include the temporary remittance tax for those years; all others
include only the nominal exchange rate.
peggedeffective import rate. This rate was below the rates reached during
1958; even after it was raised to 6.7 pesos, in 1960, it remained substantially
below the late-1958 de facto levels.
It is noteworthy that such a return to "stability" was partly promoted by
those who after 1967 became champions of the crawling rate. The reasons
given for the new pegging in 1959werethe usual ones: fear of inflation, need
for "stability," and the impact of a more devalued peso on public and private
foreign debts denominated in dollars. Naturally, as erosion of the realor
purchasing-power-parity import exchange rate continued from its 1958 levels,
increasing use was made of prior deposits, tariffs, and import controls, until,
late in 1962, the pressures became too great. The unfortunate 1962 episode will
be reviewed in detail later; here it is enough to note that its origins can be
traced back to the misguided repegging of 1959. From the end of 1962 until
September 1965, the mirage of a stable import rate was again sought; the .
pegged9-peso rate was buttressed primarily by tight import controls.
Primarily because of the existence of import controls applied with fluc-
tuating severity in different periods, there is little systematic link between the
real effective import exchange rate and actual imports. Correlations between
percentage changes in imports and in the exchange rate and the stability index
presented in Table 4-8, similar in structure to the regressions presented in
Chapter 2 for minor exports, yield only insignificant coefficients and very low
R2s,whetherthe period is considered as a whole or is broken up into
subperiods.
The first two columns of Table 4-9 contain annual summaries of the 14
quarterlydata shown in Table 4-8. In column 3, the nominal import exchange
rate is also compared to that prevailing in the legal free or capital market; the
latter was often pegged. The comparison shown in column 4 is with rates that ri'
were always free, if not always legal; the source for that column is Pick's a
CurrencyYearbook, whichpublishes black market rates. The figures in theTHE AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE FOR MERCHANDISE IMPORTS 119
TABLE 4-9
Characteristics of theAverage Import Exchange Rate.1956—72
Legal Free or CapitalFree, Capital,
Average PPP-NER Market Rate as or Black Market
for Merchandise ImportsInstability Per Cent of Rate as Per Cent
(pesos per U.S. dol.) Index Col. I of Col. 1
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1956 5.39 2.59 198.4 200.8
1957 7.20 28.90 157.0 160.2
1958 11.17 7.06 107.5 107.5
1959 9.88 7.09 112.7 113.3
1960 9.18 1.23 104.7 104.2
1961 8.70 1.63 123.9 124.3
1962 8.67 2.24 133.3 134.0
1963 9.02 6.53 111.3 112.6
1964 7.68 2.59 115.9 1I6.4
1965 7.93 7.21 170.1 168.5
1966 9.13 2.21 131.1 134.9
1967 9.35 2.83 115.6 136.1
1968 10.30 1.97 101.6 112.6
1969 10.71 0.78 — 110.6
1970 11.01 1.61 — 118.5
1971 11.34 0.40 — 118.2
1972 11.55 0.76 — 109.6
Sousce: Figures in columns I and 2 are from quarterly data in Table 4-8. Exchange rates for the
legalcapitalor free markets, used in column 3. from A. R. Musalem, Dinero.InflaciOn y Balanza de
Pagos: La Experiencia de Colombia en la Posi-Guerra (Bogota:Talleres Gráficos del Banco de Ia
Repüblica, 1971), Table XXIV, p. l60. Exchange rates used in column 4. which also include black
market rates, from PicksCurrency Yearbook, variousissues. Figures in both columns 3 and 4 are
based on monthly data, although their timing may not be identical. In 1968 the official capital market
was merged with the certificate market.
last column should always be equal to or greater than those in the third
column; the anomalous observations for 1960 and 1965 are due to differences
in the timing of monthly observations on which the data are based.
The course of the rates in the last two columns of Table 4-9 clearly signals
troubled years, such as 1956—57, 1961—62, and 1965—67, but that in the last
column also reflects the success of the crawling peg instituted in 1967,t4
Thebureaucratic agencies officially in charge of establishing exchange
rate policy have differed from time to time. During the Lleras Restrepo
administration, the President himself kept a close watch over the exchange
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Monetaria, acting through the central bank, is charged with regulating the
market for foreign exchange. The key personalities in the junta are the
Minister of the Treasury and the manager of the central bank. The certificate
or basic rate is typically modified (raised) twice a week, by small amounts.
Monthly changes in the certificate rate since the reforms of March 1967
are shown in Table 4-10. At the start of the new system, the monthly changes
were fairly irregular, apparently in an attempt to establish the principle that
this was indeed a fairly unregulated market, closer to "dirty floating" than to a
crawling peg system, and that it could even appreciate, as it did during
January 1968. These early exchange-rate movements were anxiously watched
by Colombia's creditors and aid donors, who doubted the firmness of the
Colombian commitment to a crawling peg. It is said that the slowdown in the
rate of depreciation during December 1967 and January 1968 caused telegrams
to fly between Washington and Bogota, and fear was expressed that once the
certificate rate reached the capital market rate (which had been pegged at 16.3
pesos since the capital market replaced the free market early in December
1966) and was unified with it, there would be a return to a fixed 16.3-peso peg.
The unification point was reached in June 1968, but the upward crawling
continued, although not without an unusually low depreciation rate during that
month, which must have caused a few jitters. But the low depreciation rates of
June, July, and August 19.68 apparently had more to do with the endeavor of
creating a calm atmosphere for the visit of His Holiness Pope Paul VI to
Colombia, during August 22—24, than with any attempt to return to a fixed
peg. Similarly, the difficult political situation that developed between the
election and inauguration of President Misael Pastrana Borrero (April—August
1970) seems to account for the slowdown in the depreciation rate observed in
those months. After the new President was inaugurated, the rate of deprecia-
tion became steadier, seldom falling outside a range of 0.6 to 0.9 per cent per
month. The acceleration of inflation since 1971, and the improvement at the
same time of Colombian terms of trade, led some to call for a slower upward
crawl in the exchange rate, as part of anti-inflationary policies. It remains to be
seen whether the crawling peg will work as well (or will be allowed to work)
under conditions of accelerating inflation, as it did when inflation rates were
low or decreasing.
It is not clear how much the demand for import licenses and for imports
on the free list influences the decisions to alter the exchange rate. It is said that
foreign creditors, and in particular the IMF, annually agree with Colombian
authorities on a minimum target for imports so as to decrease any temptation
to slow down the depreciation rate and tighten import controls. It is known
that authorities also try to maintain some sort of link between depreciation and
inflation in Colombia and abroad but, given the weaknesses of price indices




1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
January 0 —0.13 0 0.39 0.63 0.76 0.75
February 0 0.95 0.59 0.67 0.57 0.71 0.52
March 0.07 0.57 0.71 0.89 0.93 0.89 0.52
April 2.81 0.75 0.18 0.27 0.67 0.75 0.52
May 2.23 0.81 0.47 0.38 0.41 0.74 0.43
June 1.97 0.12 0.58 0.55 0.81 0.74 0.43
July 1.24 0.62 0.46 0.43 0.91 0.50 0.64
August 2.39 0.43 0.92 0.54 0.85 0.73 0.84
September 1.93 0.73 0.06 0.70 0.74 0.59 0.75
October 0.92 0.85 0.40 0.75 0.79 0.76 0.96
November 1.36 0.84 0.51 0.48 0.88 0.62 0.78
December 0.70 0.36 0.73 0.74 0.97 0.80 1.31
Average 1.73a 0.58 0.47 0.57 0.76 0.72 0.70
December-to-
December
























SouRce: Certificate rate quotations taken at the end of each month. Basic data from IMF-
IFS. (The buying rate or "other export rate" has been used; the principal selling rate behaves
almost identically.) Fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter percentage changes in Colombian and
U.S. price indices (averages for the quarter; basic data from IMF-IFS) have been as follows:
Colombia U.S.
Wholesale Consumer Wholesale Consumer
Prices Prices Prices Prices
1966—67 6.0 6.9 0.4 2.9
1967—68 5.2 5.7 3.0 4.7
1968—69 9.2 12.8 4.6 5.8
1969—70 6.3 3.3 2,8 5.6
1970—71 11.7 13.5 3.4 3.5
1971—72 21.0 17.2 5.6 3.4






a. April through December only.
Note, however, how the depreciation rate accelerated during 1971 and 1972 as
the Colombian inflation picked up. It appears that broad depreciation targets
are set on a yearly basis, depending on expected inflation, imports, exchange
earnings, and other factors, and from then on the monthly rate is determined
"by ear." On the whole, once inflation is taken into account the policy has122TARIFFS, PRIOR DEPOSITS, AND THE IMPORT EXCHANGE RATE
more in common with that based on a flrmiy pegged exchange rate, under
conditions of price stability, than with one allowing a freely fluctuating rate. 4'
Sofar, the results of the policy appear to have been favorable.
NOTES
1. See particularly Luis Ospina Vflsquez, IndustriayProtecciOn en Colombia, 1810—! 930
(MedellIn:E.S.F.,1955).
2.It is easily forgotten that high internal transport barriers so fragmented the Colombian
markets for goods and factors of production that, until fairly recently, aggregate data for the whole
nation had a misleading synthetic quality. Even today, just as the abrupt Colombian geography
generates a myriad of microclimates, it continues to hamper factor and commodity price equaliza-
tion within the country.
3. This paragraph is based on David S. C. Chu. "The Great Depression and Industrialization
in Latin America: Response to Relative Price Incentives in Argentina and Colombia, 1930—1945"
(Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1972). Chap. 2 and App. B-2; and on UNECLA, "The'Economic
Policy of Colombia in 1950—66, Economic Bulletin for Latin America, October 1967, especially
pp. 90—95. The protectionist intent of pre-1930 Colombian tariffs, however, is probably underesti-
mated in the literature.
4. According to Departamento Administrativo de PlaneaciOn y Servicios Técnicos, Plan
Decenal de Desarrollo EconOmico Industrial, 1960—I 970 (Bogota, n.d.), Chap. IV.
5. According to Benjamin 1. Cohen, "An Analysis of Colombia's Exports," mimeographed
(AID, September 22, 1965), p. 3. Toward the end of 1959, according to the data presented in
ECLA. "Custom Duties and Other Import Charges and Restrictions in Latin American Countries:
Average Levels of Incidence," mimeographed (n.d., E/CN.12/554 and Add. 1-1 1), the arithmetic
means of customs duties and other charges (including the cost of financing prior deposits) in ad
valorem equivalents in Colombia were as follows (in percentages): total, 41; unprocessed food-
stuffs, 68: raw materials. 31: intermediate products, 36: processed fuels. II: capital goods, 27:
processed foodstuffs and tobacco, 138; chemical and pharmaceutical products, 31; durable con-
sumer goods, 101; and other consumer goods, 57.
6. In his influential article "Protectionism and Industrialization in Latin America," Eco-
nomic Bulletin for Latin America. March 1964, pp. 61—101.
7. See David Morawetz's writings on this subject, particularly 'Common External Tariff for
the Andean Group," mimeographed (Cambridge: Harvard Development Advisory Service, 1972).
Colombia apparently succeeded in obtaining a minimum common tariff close toits own in
exchange for going along with a common code for direct foreign investment that was tougher than
it wished.
8. Other tariff summaries confirm, in general, these conclusions. See in particular, Instituto
para Ia Integración de America Latina, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, "Instituciones e
Insti-umentos de Politica Econômica Colombiana en Materia de Comercio Exterior," mimeo-
graphed (November 1968), Table 2; and David Morawetz, . 'Harmonization of Economic Policies
in Customs Unions: The Andean Group, mimeographed (Cambridge: Harvard Development
Advisory Service, December 1971), p. ha.
9. See Richard A. Musgrave, President, and Malcolm Gillis, Editor, Fiscal Reform for
Colombia: Final Report and Staff Papers of the Colombian Commission on Tax Reform (Cam-
bridge: Harvard Law School, International Tax Program, 1971), especially Chaps. 12 and 13.
Important tax reform measures were adopted during the second half of 1974.NOTES 123
10.See, for example, El Tiempo of September 10, 1971, where it was reported that the
Executive had asked Congress to eliminate the heavy consumption tax on imported cigarettes
decreed in Law 19 of December 1970, arguing that otherwise smuggling could not be stopped. The
Minister of the Treasury sensibly argued that ... publicand ostentatious smuggling weakens
national morality, weakens the prestige of public institutions, and discredits the country in the
eyes of foreigners." In 1971. national tax revenues from cigarette imports were running 60 percent
belowthoseof 1970, as a result of the higher tax.
11. In a remarkable move, the Director of Customs called a press conference during August
1971 to denounce widespread corruption and inefficiency in the nation's customs administration
10 and its harbors, particularly in those of Buenaventura. He announced measures to control such
ills, but complained that import and sales taxes provided very strong stimuli to contraband,
referring in particular to Law 19 of December 1970, whose approval he had opposed. He
le denounced conditions in the harbor of Buenaventura, where there were ten known organizations
dedicated exclusively to stealing goods in transit, often in complicity with public employees in
a- customs, the railroad, and harbor. Even eighty tons of steel were stolen! Such raids are often
sponsored by the owners of the merchandise, so that they can obtain insurance payments as well
as new import licenses. See El Tiempo, August 26, 1971.
12. See Luis J. Garay S. et al., Andlisis de Ia Estructura de Control a Las t,nportaciones en
UC Colombia,2 vols. (Bogota: FEDESARROLLO, August 1974). This valuable study was based on a
large sample covering about 75 per cent of all items in the tariff. The data refer to imports actually
.ti realized,i.e., those for which permits had been obtained from INCOMEX, a procedure the
authors regard as underestimating nominal and effective protection (I, 63). The calculations take
an into account only tariffs plus an estimate of the opportunity cost of prior import deposits; the
latter, however, accounts for only about 10 per cent of the ad valorem rates mentioned in the text.
ed 13.It appears that Musalem computes the opportunity cost of the idle deposits at the rate of
inflation plus average yields on the Bogota stock exchange. The latter, however, may already
S. allowfor inflationary expectations, in which case the figures overestimate opportunity cost. See
tic Alberto Roque Musalem, Dinero, Inflación.y Balanza de Pagos: La Experiencia de Colombia en
Ia Post-Guerra (Bogota: Talleres Gráficos del Banco de Ia RepOblica, 1971), p.154. In his
27
calculations Musalem also includes the opportunity cost of the prior deposits required before the
central bank hands over the foreign exchange needed to pay for imports. In the FEDESAR-
ROLLO study mentioned earlier in this chapter, it is estimated that the ad valorem equivalent
opportunity cost of prior deposits for imports that had been granted licenses was 4 per cent in 1972
and 3 per cent in 1974.
f r 14. During 1972—74, the narrowing of the gap between the official and black-market rates,
coupled with the CAT, gave rise to charges of fake export registrations with INCOMEX and BdIR.
Thus, one could buy dollars in the black market at rates, say, 10 per cent higher than the certi-
ian ficate rate. He could then go to the authorities to register exports (such as pieces of glass), sur-
rendering the dollars, for which he would obtain the certificate rate plusthe CAT.
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